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Abstract. Reasoning about what is best for an agent to do in a particular situ-
ation is a challenging task. What makes it even more challenging in a dynamic
environment is the existence of norms that aim to regulate a self-interested agent’s
behaviour. Practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do in a given situation,
particularly in the presence of conflicts between the agent’s practical attitude such
as goals, plans and norms. In this paper we: (i) introduce a formal model for nor-
mative practical reasoning that allows an agent to plan for multiple and poten-
tially conflicting goals and norms at the same time (ii) identify the best plan(s)
for the agent to execute by means of argumentation schemes and critical ques-
tions (iii) justify the best plan(s) via an argumentation-based persuasion dialogue
for grounded semantics.
1 Introduction
Autonomous agents operating in a dynamic environment must be able to reason and
make decisions about actions in pursuit of their goals. In addition, in a normative en-
vironment an agent’s actions are not only directed by the agent’s goals, but also by the
norms imposed on the agent. Norms are a well understood approach for declaratively
specifying desirable behaviour by stating under which circumstances the performance
of which actions or reaching which states are obliged or prohibited. When modelled
as soft constraints, norms allow more flexible behaviour by defining a reward and pun-
ishment associated with compliance and violation. To avoid punishment, agents must
comply with norms while pursuing their goals. However, if complying with a norm hin-
ders a more important goal or norm, the agent should consider violating it. In order to
decide what to do, an agent performing normative practical reasoning therefore needs to
constantly weigh up the importance of goal achievement and norm compliance against
the cost of goals being ignored and norms being violated, in different plans.
Although practical reasoning frameworks that take norms into account exist (e.g. [1,
2, 3], there has been little attention paid to the explanation and justification of agents’
decision making in such frameworks. The conflicts that arise between the practical atti-
tudes of agents, such as goals, plans and norms, can make explaining the agent’s deci-
sion making process very complicated. Argumentation has been shown to be a promis-
ing means for reasoning in the presence of inconsistent information [4]. In addition to
assisting agents’ reasoning, argumentation supports explaining agents’ decision making
via argumentation-based dialogues (e.g. [5]). Argumentation has previously been ap-
plied in practical reasoning and in the justification of the agent’s decision making (e.g.
[6, 7, 8]). However, the existing approaches suffer from at least one of the following
problems: (i) the normative aspects of the agents operating in a dynamic environment
are not taken into consideration [6, 7]; (ii) the planning aspects of the practical rea-
soning problem is either abstracted away, or is not computationally implemented [6, 7,
8]; (iii) the conflicts identified between actions, goals, norms and plans are static and
disregard the temporal essence of conflict [6].
In this paper we aim at presenting a model that integrates normative reasoning into
practical reasoning. The model is implemented formally in a way that handles durative
actions and time explicitly, hence enriching reasoning about conflicts. In order to de-
velop a pattern of arguments to reason about conflicts in such a model, we use argument
schemes and their associated critical questions [9]. Argument schemes are reasoning
patterns expressed in natural language and critical questions are situations in which the
scheme does not apply and are used to question the arguments constructed based on
the schemes. These argument schemes employed in an argumentation framework (AF)
enable the agent to identify and justify the best course of action. Although all of the
existing approaches mentioned earlier use argumentation to identify the best course of
actions for the agent to take, to the best of our knowledge our framework is the first one
that uses the argumentation-based persuasion dialogue in [10] to engage in an internal
dialogue to justify this choice.
The paper is organised as follows. After describing the formal model in the next
section, we discuss arguments and their relations in Section 3. Section 4 demonstrates
the dialogue used in this work, followed by an illustrative example in Section 5. Related
work and conclusions are discussed in sections 6 and 7, respectively.
2 A Formal Model for Normative Practical Reasoning
This section offers a formal model and its semantics for normative practical reasoning.
The foundation of this model is classical planning in which an agent is presented with a
set of actions and a goal. Any sequence of actions that satisfies the goal is a solution for
the planning problem. In section 2.1 we extend the classical planning problem by sub-
stituting a single goal with a set of potentially inconsistent goalsG and a corresponding
set of norms N . A solution for such a problem is any sequence of actions that satisfies
at least one goal. The agent has the choice of violating or complying with triggered
norms, while satisfying its goals.
2.1 The Model
A normative temporal planning system is a tuple P = (FL,∆,A,G,N) where FL is
a set of fluents, ∆ is the initial state, A is a set of durative STRIPS-like [11] actions,
G denotes the set of agent goals and N denotes a set of norms imposed on the agent
actions, that define what an agent is obliged or forbidden to do under certain conditions.
We now describe each of these elements in more details.
Fluents FL is a set of domain fluents that accounts for the description of the domain
the agent operates in. A literal l is a fluent or its negation i.e. l = fl or l = ¬fl for some
fl ∈ FL. For a set of literals L, we define L+ = {fl|fl ∈ L} and L− = {fl|¬fl ∈ L}
to denote the set of positive and negative fluents in L respectively. L is well-defined if
there exists no fluent fl ∈ FL such that fl ∈ L and ¬fl ∈ L, i.e. if L+ ∩ L− = ∅.
The semantics of the model are defined over a set of states S. A state s ⊆ FL is
determined by set of fluents that hold true at a given time, while other fluents (those
not present) are considered false. A state s ∈ S satisfies fluent fl ∈ FL (i.e. s |= fl) if
fl ∈ s and it satisfies its negation ¬fl if fl 6∈ s. This notation can be extended to a set of
literals as follows: the set X is satisfied in state s, where s |= x, when ∀x ∈ X · s |= x.
Initial State The set of fluents that hold at the initial state is denoted by ∆ ⊆ FL.
Actions A is a set of durative STRIPS-like actions, that is actions with preconditions
and postconditions that take a non-zero duration of time to have their effects in terms of
their postconditions. A durative action a = 〈pr, ps, d〉 is composed of well-defined sets
of literals pr(a), ps(a) to represents a’s preconditions and postconditions and a positive
number d(a) ∈ N for its duration. Postconditions are further divided into a set of add
postconditions ps(a)+ and a set of delete postconditions ps(a)−. An action a can be
executed in a state s if its preconditions hold in s (i.e. s |= pr(a). The postconditions
of a durative action are applied in the state s at which the action ends (i.e. s |= ps(a)+
and s 6|= ps(a)−) .
The model allows concurrency unless there is a concurrency conflict between some
actions, which prevents them from being executed in an overlapping period of time. Two
actions a1 and a2 are in a concurrency conflict if the preconditions or postconditions of
a1 contradicts the preconditions or postconditions of a2 [12].
GoalsG denotes a set of (possibly inconsistent) goals. Goals identify the state of affairs
in the world that an agent wants to satisfy. Each goal g ∈ G is defined as a well-defined
set of literals, that should hold in order to satisfy the goal. Goal g is satisfied in the
state s when s |= g. A set of goal Gi ⊆ G is consistent iff 6 ∃g1, g2 s.t. g1 ∪ g2 is not
well-defined.
Norms N denotes a set of event-based norms to which the agent is subject. Each norm
is a quadruple of the form 〈d o, a1, a2, d 〉, where
• d o ∈ {o, f} is the deontic operator determining the type of norm, which can be an
obligation or prohibition.
• a1 ∈ A is the action that counts as the norm activation condition.
• a2 ∈ A is the action that is subject to obligation or prohibition.
• d ∈ N is the norm deadline that is a time instant defined relative to the activation
of the norm through the execution of a1.
An obligation norm expresses that taking action a1 obliges the agent to take action a2
within d time units of norm activation. Such an obligation is complied with if the agent
starts executing a2 before the deadline and is violated otherwise. A prohibition norm
expresses that taking action a1 prohibits the agent from taking action a2 within d time
units of norm activation. Such a prohibition is complied with if the agent does not take
a2 before the deadline and is violated otherwise.
2.2 Semantics of The Model
Suppose that P = (FL,∆,A,G,N) is a normative planning problem with the syntax
given previously. A plan is represented by a sequence of actions taken at certain times,
denoted as: pi = 〈(a0, t0), · · · , (an, tn)〉, which means that action ai is executed at time
ti ∈ Z+ s.t. ∀i < j we have ti < tj . The total duration of a plan, Makespan(pi), is
calculated by the relation: Makespan(pi) = max(ti + d(ai)). The evolution of a se-
quence of actions for a given starting state s0 = ∆ is a sequence of states 〈s0, · · · sm〉
for every discrete time interval from t0 to m, where m = Makespan(pi). The transi-
tion relation between two states is defined by Equation 1. If an action aj ends at time
ti, state si results from removing all negative postconditions and adding all positive
postconditions of action aj to state si−1. If there is no action ending at si, si remains
the same as si−1.
∀i > 0 : si =
{
(si−1 \ ps(aj)−) ∪ ps(aj)+ i = tj + d(aj)
si−1 otherwise
(1)
A sequence of actions pi satisfies a goal, s |= g, if there is at least one state si in
the sequence of states caused by the sequence of actions in pi, such that si |= g. We
therefore have pi |= Gj iff ∀g ∈ Gj ,∃ i ∈ [1,m] such that si |= g. An obligation
n1 = 〈o, ai, aj , d 〉 is complied with in plan pi (i.e. pi |= n1) if the action that is the
norm activation condition has occurred ((ai, ti) ∈ pi), and the action that is the subject
of the obligation occurs ((aj , tj) ∈ pi) between when the condition holds and when the
deadline expires (tj ∈ (ti, d + ti)). If ai has occurred but aj does not occur at all or
occurs in a period other than the one specified, the obligation is violated (i.e. pi 6|= n1).
In the case of prohibition n2 = 〈f, ai, aj , d 〉, compliance happens if the action that
is the norm activation condition has occurred ((ai, ti) ∈ pi) and the action that is the
subject of the prohibition does not occur in the period between when the condition holds
and when the deadline expires (6 ∃(aj , tj) ∈ pi s.t. tj ∈ (ti, d + ti)). If ai has occurred
and aj occurs in the specified period, the prohibition norm is violated (i.e. pi 6|= n2).
Two obligation norms n1 = 〈o, a1, a2, d 〉 and n2 = 〈o, b1, b2, d ′〉 are in conflict
in the context of plan pi iff: (1) their activation conditions hold, (2) the obliged actions
a2 and b2 have a concurrency conflict and (3) a2 is in progress during the entire period
over which the agent is obliged to take action b2. On the other hand, a norm of type
obligation n1 = 〈o, a1, a2, d 〉 and a norm of type prohibition n2 = 〈f, b1, a2, d ′〉 are
in conflict in the context of plan pi iff: (1) their activation conditions hold and (2) n2
forbids the agent from taking action a2 during the entire period over which n1 obliges
the agent to take a2.
A norm of type obligation n = 〈o, a1, a2, d 〉 and a goal g are in conflict, if tak-
ing action a2 that is the subject of the obligation, brings about postconditions that are
in conflict with the requirements of goal g. In addition, a norm of type prohibition
n = 〈f, a1, a2, d 〉 and a goal g are in conflict, if the postconditions of a2 contribute to
satisfying g, but taking action a2 is prohibited by norm n.
Sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, t0), · · · , (an, tn)〉 is a valid plan1 and solution for P iff:
1 We assume that plans are given by a sound planning system and make no further assumption
about the implementation.
1. all the fluents in ∆ hold at time t0.
2. for each i, the preconditions of action ai holds at time ti, as well as through the
execution of ai.
3. a non-empty consistent subset of goals (i.e. Gj ⊆ G and Gj 6= ∅) is satisfied in the
path from initial state s0 to the state holding at time tm, wherem =Makespan(pi).
4. there is no concurrency conflict between actions that are executed concurrently.
5. there is no conflict between any of the norms complied with.
6. there is no conflict between goals satisfied and norms complied with.
3 Argument Scheme and Critical Questions
The formal model explained in the previous section defines all possible plans Π that
the agent can execute to satisfy at least one of its goals. Regarding norms, when the
course of actions in a plan triggers a norm, the possible outcomes of violating or com-
plying with that norm are generated separately. In order to identify the best plan(s) for
the agent to execute, if any, we first augment the tuple P = 〈FL,∆,A,G,N〉 with a
partial, irreflexive and transitive preference relation Pref gn that expresses agent’s pref-
erences over goals and norms: Pref gn ⊆ (G ∪ N) × (G ∪ N). If the agent prefers
satisfying goal α (or complying with norm α) over satisfying goal β (or complying
with norm β), we have (α, β) ∈ Pref gn. The preference relation over plans, on the
other hand, comes from the fact that the lesser number of violations is always preferred
over more. Thus, plan pi1 is preferred over plan pi2, iff they satisfy the same set of goals,
while pi1 has fewer violations. Assuming that the sets satisfiedi and violatedi de-
fine the set of satisfied goals and violated norms in plan pii: satisfiedi = {gj |gj ∈
G, pii |= gj} and violatedi = {nk|nk ∈ N, pii 6|= nk}, we have: iff satisfied1 =
satisfied2, violated1 ( violated2 then (pi1, pi2) ∈ Pref pi .
Having defined the preference relations Pref gn and Pref pi , we now use argument
schemes and critical questions [9] to construct and evaluate a set of arguments involved
in practical reasoning. The arguments and their relationships defined through arguments
schemes and critical questions, respectively, plus arguments preferences that result from
agent preferences discussed above, form a preference-based argumentation framework
(PAF) [13]. The evaluation of such a PAF according to grounded semantics results in an
unique extension containing a set of arguments that are justified in all senses. The choice
of grounded semantics for sceptical reasoning has pragmatic and philosophical reasons
that are discussed in details in [14]. By using a persuasion dialogue for the grounded
semantics [10] in the next section, we justify how the plan argument(s) included in the
grounded extension identify the best plan(s) for the agent to execute.
Definition 1. A PAF is a triplet (Arg,Att, Pr) where Arg is a set of arguments, Att
is a binary attack relation between arguments, Att ⊆ Arg ×Arg, and Pr is a (partial
or complete) preordering on Arg × Arg. Argument a is preferred over argument b iff
(a, b) ∈ Pr and (b, a) 6∈ Pr. The defeat relation between two argument Def ⊆ Arg×
Arg is therefore defined as: ∀a, b ∈ Arg, a defeats b iff (a, b) ∈ Att and (b, a) 6∈ Pr.
The arguments, Arg, in the created PAF consists of three disjoint sets of arguments
Argpi, Argg , andArgn, obtained from three separate argument schemes defined in Sec-
tion 3.1. The attack relation, Att, between arguments is instantiated through the appli-
cation of six critical questions described in Section 3.2. The preference relations, Pr,
between goal arguments and norm arguments results from the preference relations ex-
pressed by the agent over goals and norms: iff (α, β) ∈ Prefgn then (Argα, Argβ) ∈
Pr. The same applies to plan arguments: iff (γ, λ) ∈ Prefpi then (Argγ , Argλ) ∈ Pr.
3.1 Formal Model of Arguments
We now express three argumentation schemes in order to construct a set of arguments
for normative practical reasoning: plan arguments, goal arguments and norm arguments.
These arguments will be used to conduct the dialogue between a proponent that aims at
convincing an opponent to accept why a particular plan should be executed. An oppo-
nent can question the proponent claim by asking why a certain goal was not satisfied in
the proposed plan, or why a certain norm was violated.
AS1: This argument scheme results in constructing an argument for each plan (Argpi)
obtained from our formal model and is used by the agent to put forward a sequence of
actions and as a proponent claims that the proposed sequence should be executed:
- In the initial state ∆
- The agent should perform sequence of actions pi = 〈(a1, t1), · · · , (an, tn)〉
- which will realise set of goals G′ (pi |= G′) and complies with set of norms
N ′ (pi |= N ′) and violates set of norms N ′′ (pi 6|= N ′′)
AS2: This argument scheme results in constructing an argument for each goal that is
feasible. A goal is feasible if it is satisfied in at least one plan. If a goal in not feasible, a
rational agent should not adopt it or try to justify its adoption (for more details see [15]).
A goal argument (Argg) is used by an opponent to explore why a goal is not satisfied
in a plan, or to address the conflict between two goals or a goal and a norm:
- Goal g is a feasible goal of the agent
- Therefore, satisfying g is required.
AS3: This argument scheme results in constructing an argument for each norm (Argn)
that is activated in at least one plan and is used by an opponent to explore why a norm
is violated in a plan. It is also used to address the conflict between two norms or a
goal and a norm. An activated norm is not necessarily activated in all plans. To allow
reasoning about norms only in the context of the plans they are activated in, the norm
(e.g. nk) is augmented as (e.g. nki) where i is the index of the plan in which nk is
activated. Note that, this operation does not effect the preference relations discussed
earlier. For instance, if the agent prefers satisfying g2 to complying with norm n1, g2 
n1, argument for this goal, Argg2 , is preferred to all the arguments for norm Argn1i ,
where i is represents the plans in which norm n1 was activated.
- Norm nk is an activated norm imposed to the agent in plan pii
- Therefore, complying with nki is required
3.2 Argument Interactions
The six critical questions in this section describe the ways arguments built in the previ-
ous section can attack each other. These CQs are associated to one or more AS, which
are listed after each CQ.
CQ1 (AS2): Does a goal conflict with another goal? This CQ results in an attack
between arguments for conflicting goals. Attacks caused by CQ1 are by definition sym-
metric and irreflexive. This can be formulated as:
Iff g1 ∪ g2 is not well-defined then (Argg1 , Argg2), (Argg2 , Argg1) ∈ Att.
CQ2 (AS3): Does a norm conflict with another norm? Conflict between two norms
is contextual based, the context being defined as the plan the norms are activated in.
For instance, norms n1 and n2 might be in conflict in plan pii (i.e., Argn1i and Argn2i
attack each other) while they are conflict-free in plan pij . Similar to CQ1, attacks caused
by CQ2 are by definition symmetric and irreflexive. It is defined in Section 2.2 what it
means for two norms to be conflicting. The definitions are formulated as follows.
Two obligation norms n1 = 〈o, a1, a2, d 〉 and n2 = 〈o, b1, b2, d ′〉 are in conflict in the
context of plan pii:
Iff (a1, ta1), (b1, tb1), (a2, ta2) ∈ pii, s.t. ta2 ∈ (ta1 , ta1 + d ) and (tb1 , tb1 + d ′) ⊆
(ta2 , ta2 + d(a2)) then (Argn1i , Argn2i), (Argn2i , Argn1i) ∈ Att.
A norm of type obligation n1 = 〈o, a1, a2, d 〉 and a norm of type prohibition n2 =
〈f, b1, a2, d ′〉 are in conflict in the context of plan pii:
Iff (a1, ta1), (b1, tb1) ∈ pii s.t. (ta1 , ta1 + d ) ⊆ (tb1 , tb1 + d ′) then
(Argn1i , Argn2i), (Argn2i , Argn1i) ∈ Att.
CQ3 (AS1): Is there any other preferred plan available? This CQ results in an attack
from plan argument Argpi1 to plan argument Argpi2 , when plan pi1 is preferred over
plan pi2. Attacks caused by CQ3 are by definition asymmetric and irreflexive:
Iff (pi1, pi2) ∈ Prefpi then (Argpi1 , Argpi2) ∈ Att.
CQ4 (AS1): Is there any conflict between a goal and a plan? This CQ results in an
attack from a goal argument to a plan argument, when the goal is not satisfied in the
plan. Attacks caused by CQ4 are by definition asymmetric and are formulated as:
Iff pii 6|= gj then (Arggj , Argpii) ∈ Att.
CQ5 (AS2-AS3): Is there any conflict between a norm and a goal? The conflict be-
tween a norm and a goal is defined in Section 2.2 and is formulated below. Attacks
caused by CQ5 are by definition symmetric.
A norm of type obligation n1 = 〈o, a1, a2, d 〉 and a goal gj are in conflict:
iff ps(a2) ∪ gj is not well-defined then ∀n1i, s.t. pii ∈ Π :
(Argn1i , Arggj ), (Arggj , Argn1i) ∈ Att.
A norm of type prohibition n2 = 〈f, a1, a2, d 〉 and a goal gj are in conflict:
iff ps(a2) ∩ gj 6= ∅ then ∀n2i, s.t. pii ∈ Π : (Argn2i , Arggj ), (Arggj , Argn2i) ∈ Att.
CQ6 (AS1): Is there any conflict between a norm and a plan? This CQ results in an
attack from a norm argument to a plan argument, when the norm is violated in the plan.
This asymmetric attack is formulated as: Iff pii 6|= nj then (Argnji , Argpii) ∈ Att.
3.3 Grounded Extension and Properties of Plan Arguments
We organise the instantiation of the arguments and their relations, as presented in the
previous section, within a PAF = (Arg,Att, Pr), which, based on Definition 1, can
be mapped to a Dung AF = (Arg,Def). The grounded extension of the AF, Gr,
determines if a plan should be identified as a basis for the agent’s action execution.
Property 1. For any plan pi, Argpi ∈ Gr iff there is no plan better than pi.
Property 2. Let ARGpi be the set of all plan arguments in the grounded extension:
ARGpi = {Argpi|Argpi ∈ Gr}.
– if ARGpi = ∅, then a unique best plan does not exist.
– if card(ARGpi) = 1, then Argpi ∈ ARGpi is the best plan for the agent to execute.
– if card(ARGpi) > 1, then the preference information available is insufficient to
identify a single best plan. Thus all Argpi ∈ ARGpi are the best plans and the agent
can choose any of them as the basis of what to execute.
Property 3. If card(ARGpi) = 1 and Argpi is the best plan then ∀gj ∈ G,nk ∈
N s.t. pi |= gj , pi |= nk, we have: Arggj , Argnk ∈ Gr.
4 Persuasion Dialogue for Grounded Semantics
This section demonstrates a persuasion dialogue game for grounded semantics. The
main motivation behind the development of argumentation-based dialogues is to bring
the mathematical intuition behind the semantics closer to human way of interacting
when trying to convince one another of their perspective. However, these dialogues have
rarely been used in practice. The contribution of this paper is not in introducing a new
dialogue, but instead is in applying an existing dialogue game to a practical reasoning
problem, where the agent engages in this internal dialogue to justify why a plan(s) is the
best plan(s) to execute. The purpose of the dialogue is to show that if a plan argument
is in the grounded extension of an AF, the agent can dialectically point out the reason
for why this particular course of action should be executed. The dialogue is based on
Caminada’s complete and grounded labelling that is stated in the following definition
taken from [16].
Definition 2. Let (Arg,Def) be a Dung argumentation framework, a (partial) argu-
ment labelling is a (partial) function lab : Arg → {in, out, undec}. A non-partial
argument labelling is called a complete labelling iff for each argument a ∈ Arg it
holds that a is labelled ‘in’ iff each attacker of a is labelled ‘out’ and a is labelled ‘out’
iff there exists an attacker of a that is labelled ‘in’.
A complete labelling is called the (unique) grounded labelling Lgr iff its set of
in-labelled arguments is minimal (or equivalently, iff its set of out-labelled arguments
is minimal, or iff its set of undec-labelled arguments is maximal among all complete
labellings.
The persuasion dialogue for grounded semantics is defined such that for any ar-
gument a ∈ Arg there exists a grounded discussion that is won by a proponent iff
Lgr(a) = in. A discussion move in this dialogue is a triple M = (P, T ,L), where
P is the player: P ∈ {proponent, opponent}, T is one of the following moves:
T ∈ {claim,why, because, concede} and L is a partial labelling. claim is always
the first move in the dialogue put forward by proponent to claim that an argument is
labelled in; why is a move available to the opponent to question the proponent about
why an argument is labelled in or out; because is a move with which the proponent
describes why a questioned argument is labelled in a particular way; and concede is the
move uttered by the opponent to concede an argument being labelled in or out by the
proponent earlier. The opponent is assumed to be maximally sceptical, conceding an
argument is in, if it is already committed that all attackers are out and it concedes an
argument is out if it is committed that at least one attacker is in.
The dialogue starts by the proponent (P ) putting forward a claim that an argument
is in claim in(a). The proponent (P ) and opponent (O) then take turns, while each
turn for P contains a single because move, whereas in each turn O can play more than
one concede and why move. However,O can question with why just one argument at a
time. P gets committed to arguments used in claim and because moves, while O gets
committed to concede moves. These moves can only be played if new commitment
does not contradict a previous one. P uses the because move to provide reasons for
why moves, put forward by O. The reason for an argument being labelled in can be
provided only if all its attackers are labelled out and the reason for an argument being
labelled out can be provided when at least one of its attackers is labelled in. When P or
O cannot make any more moves the dialogue terminates. If on termination,O conceded
the claim argument then P wins, otherwise O is the winner.
Using the dialogue described above, if there exists Argpi ∈ Arg s.t. Lgr(Argpi) =
in, the proponent starting the discussion by move claim in(Argpi) is guaranteed a
winning strategy to justify plan pi. The example in the following section shows the
dialogue in action.
5 Illustrative Example
In this section, we provide a brief example that, for sake of space, just highlights the
most important features of the proposed model. Let us consider an agent with the ac-
tions presented in Table 1. Apart from attend interview that has duration two, the
duration of all other actions is one. The agent has two goals namely, getting some qual-
ification and going on strike. Getting the qualification requires the agent to pay the
fee for the test, do an online theory test and attend an interview for oral examination:
g1 = {fee paid, test done, interview attended}. Going on strike on the other hand,
requires the agent to be a member of union, not to go to work nor to attend any meeting
on behalf of the company: g2 = {union member,¬office,¬meeting}. Two of the
agent’s actions, comp funding and attend interview, have normative consequences
captured in the two following norms:
n1 = 〈o, comp funding, attend meeting, 2〉: This norm expresses that if the agent
uses company funds to pay the fee for the test she wants to take, she is obliged to attend
a meeting on behalf of the company within 2 time units of execution of comp funding.
n2 = 〈f, attend interview, attend meeting, 3〉: This norm expresses that attending
the interview prohibits the agent from attending the meeting within 3 time units of
taking action attend interview.
Table 2 shows five plans for the agent, including the goal(s) satisfied and norms
complied with or violated in each plan. The positive or negative signs next to each norm
means the norm is being complied with or violated in the respective plan. The argumen-
tation graph in Figure 1 shows the arguments associated with plans, goals and norms
in table 2. Arguments Argpi1 − Argpi5 are built based on AS1, Argg1 and Argg2 are
based on AS2, and Argn11 −Argn25 are based on AS3. The attack between arguments
is labelled with the relevant critical question.
To show the role of agent preferences in reducing the two-way attacks to a one-way
defeat, we assume two different set of preferences, Pr1 and Pr2 , for a PAF with set of
Arg and Att in Figure 1. Table 3 shows the agent preferences in the first column, while
the second column translates the agent preferences to preferences between arguments.
Finally, the grounded extension, Gr, of the argumentation graph based on each set of
preferences is computed in the third column. In this specific example, each grounded
extension includes a single plan, pi5 in Gr1 and pi1 in Gr2, that according to Property 2,
is the best plan for the agent to execute.
Figures 2 and 3 show how by putting forward the argument for the best plan, that
is Argpi5 on the left hand side dialogue and Argpi1 on the right hand side dialogue,
the proponent can convince the opponent to accept this plan as the basis of what to
do. Note that the dialogue is conducted after applying the preference information in
Table 3 to the framework in Figure 1. Moreover, these two dialogues are not the only
possible dialogues. For example, in Figure 3 instead of stating because in(Argn11),
the proponent could have put forward because in(Argn12), or because in(Argn13), or
because in(Argn15).
6 Related Work
Current work on argumentation-based practical reasoning can be broadly divided into
two categories: logic-based (e.g. [6, 15, 17, 18]) and scheme-based (e.g. [7, 8]) ap-
proaches. In the former category (see details below) Dung’s AF is used to generate
a subset of consistent desires and plans to achieve them that are optimised in some
sense. Whereas, in the approach proposed in this paper argumentation techniques, i.e.
argument schemes and critical questions, are applied to a different step of the practi-
cal reasoning process, namely to identify and justify the best plan(s) out of a set of
generated plans. Plans are generated by enabling the agent to plan for multiple goals to-
gether, which not only ensures the consistency of plans, it also gives a precise account
of how the agent should execute the actions in those plans (e.g. in which order, in what
Table 1. Agent Actions
Preconditions Actions Postconditions
¬fee paid comp funding fee paid
¬test done, fee paid take test test done
¬interview attended, fee paid attend interview interview attended
¬meeting attended, office, fee paid attend meeting meeting attended
¬union member join union union member
Table 2. Agent Plans
Plans Goals Norms
pi1 =〈(comp funding, 0), (attend meeting, 1),
(take test, 2), (attend interview, 3)〉 g1 +n11,+n21
pi2 =〈(comp funding, 0), (attend interview, 1),
(take test, 2)〉 g1 −n12,+n22
pi3 =〈(comp funding, 0), (attend interview, 1),
(attend meeting, 2), (take test, 3)〉 g1 +n13,−n23
pi4 = 〈(join union, 0)〉 g2 N/A
pi5 =〈(join union, 0), (comp funding, 1),
(attend interview, 2), (take test, 3)〉 g1, g2 −n15,+n25
Argpi1
Argpi2
Argpi3
Argpi4
Argpi5
Argg1
Argg2
Argn11 Argn21
Argn12 Argn22
Argn13 Argn23
Argn15 Argn25
CQ3
CQ3
CQ4
CQ4
CQ4
CQ4
CQ5
CQ5CQ6
CQ2
CQ5
CQ2
CQ6
CQ6
CQ2
Fig. 1. Argumentation Framework of The Example
Table 3. Grounded Extensions of Graph 1
Agent Preferences Argument Preferences Grounded extension
Pref 1 ={(g2, n1),
(n1, n2)}
Pr1 ={(Argg2 , Argn11 ), (Argg2 , Argn12 ),
(Argg2 , Argn13 ), (Argg2 , Argn15 ),
(Argn11 , Argn21 ), (Argn12 , Argn22 ),
(Argn13 , Argn23 ), (Argn15 , Argn25 )}
Gr1 ={Argg1 , Argg2 , Argn21 ,
Argn22 , Argn23 , Argn25 ,
Argpi5}
Pref 2 ={(n1, n2),
(n2, g2)}
Pr2 ={(Argn11 , Argn21 ), (Argn12 , Argn22 ),
(Argn13 , Argn23 ), (Argn15 , Argn25 ),
(Argn21 , Argg2 ), (Argn22 , Argg2 ),
(Argn23 , Argg2 ), (Argn25 , Argg2 )}
Gr2 ={Argg1 , Argn11Argn21 ,
Argn12 , Argn13 , Argn15 ,
Argpi1}
1. P: claim in(Argpi5)
2. O: why in(Argpi5)
3. P: because out(Argn15)
4. O: why out(Argn15)
5. P: because in(Argg2)
6. O: concede in(Argg2)
7. O: concede out(Argn15)
8. O: concede in(Argpi5)
Fig. 2. Persuasion Dialogue for pi5 in Gr1
1. P: claim in(Argpi1)
2. O: why in(Argpi1)
3. P: because out(Argg2)
4. O: why out(Argg2)
5. P: because in(Argn11)
6. O: concede in(Argn11)
7. O: concede out(Argg2)
8. O: concede in(Argpi1)
Fig. 3. Persuasion Dialogue for pi1 in Gr2
time, consequently or concurrently, etc.). In what follows we provide a summary of [6]
and [18] as examples of logic-based approaches, followed by two examples of scheme-
based approaches, [7] and [8]. We also mention how the approach offered in this paper
compared with existing works.
Rahwan and Amgoud [6] offer an instantiation of Dung’s AF for generating con-
sistent desires and plans for BDI agents. They consider three different Dung style AFs
for arguing about beliefs and their truth value, about desires and justification of their
adoption and about intentions. Arguing about intention, i.e. what is the best course of
actions to achieve desires, is based on the utility of desires and resources required to
achieve them. Continuing the work of [6], Amgoud et al. [15] propose a constrained
argumentation system that takes arguing about desires further by excluding the possi-
bility of adopting desires that are not feasible. Unlike [6], there is no mechanism to
compare various sets of justified and feasible desires. Hulstijn and van der Torre [18],
unlike Amgoud [6, 17], do not use multiple argumentation frameworks to capture the
conflicts between beliefs, desires/goals and intentions/plans. Instead, they extract goals
by reasoning forward from desires, followed by deriving plans for goals, using planning
rules. Goals that have a plan associated with them, can be modelled as an argument con-
sisting of a claim and its necessary support. These arguments form an AF for planning,
in which there is an attack between conflicting plans. They then look for an extension
of this AF that maximises the number of achieved desires as opposed to considering the
quality or utility of these desires that is the base of comparison in [6].
The criticism about logic-based approaches is that the plan generation is not dis-
cussed and the main focus is on identifying a subset of consistent desires and their
plans. However, it is not clear how, i.e. when and in which orders, the agent should
execute those plans. More importantly and as it is discussed in [19], it is difficult to
distinguish between states and actions, which results in the intrinsic worth of actions
being neglected.
The most well-known scheme-based approach is the practical reasoning approach
offered by Atkinson and Bench-Capon [7]. The approach uses Action-based Alternating
Transition System (AATS) [20], which is instantiated based on the agent’s knowledge
of actions with pre- and post-conditions, and the values they promote. Using this AATS
along with a set of arguments schemes and critical questions, arguments are generated
for each available action. These arguments are then organised in a value-based argu-
mentation framework (VAF) [21], where the preference between arguments is defined
according to the values they promote and the goals they contribute to. Having said that
there is no measurement of how much a value is promoted. The approach proposed by
Oren [8] is also based on AATS and argumentation scheme and adopts several ideas
from [7], however, unlike [7], it permits practical reasoning in the presence of norms.
As a result preferences between arguments are defined based on considering all pos-
sible interactions between norms and goals instead of values and goals [7]. The work
done in [5] also considers norms in collaborative planning, but unlike our work and [8],
the norms are simply regimented, limiting the agent’s normative reasoning capability
to complying always with the imposed norms, without considering the possibility of
violation. Permitting violation, allows the agent to weigh up outcomes of disregarding
or adhering to a norm prior to committing to compliance or violation.
In order to avoid the shortcomings of logic-based approaches discussed in the third
paragraph of this section, we have used scheme-based practical reasoning. Closest to
our work is the approach in [8], however, instead of using AATS and evaluating all pos-
sible evolutions of the system, we approach this problem from a planning perspective,
where only those evolutions that satisfy at least one goal are evaluated. The other dif-
ference is that [8] assumes that the conflict between different entities is inferred form
paths, rather than being formulated in advance as it is in this work. Goal conflict for
instance arises due to the fact that certain actions may achieve one but not another.
Whereas, argument schemes and critical questions proposed here are based on the con-
flict formulated in the formal model level. Therefore, knowing that two goal conflict is
used in the dialogue to explain why one was satisfied in a plan and the other one was
not. In addition, in our approach, the justification of evaluation of plans to identify the
best plan(s), is formulated using a persuasion dialogue game, in which the agent argues
why a course of action should be taken.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposes a formal framework for normative practical reasoning that is able
to generate consistent plans for a set of conflicting goals and norms. The conflict be-
tween plans, goals and norms is managed by constructing arguments for these entities
and instantiating an AF according to their relations. In order to bring transparency to
the agent decision-making process when deciding which plan to execute, a persuasion
dialogue is employed. Such a dialogue dialectically points out the reasons why (i) a
goal/norm is or is not satisfied in a plan, (ii) a particular plan that pursues certain goals
while violating and complying with some norms, should be the course of actions for the
agent to execute. The main focus of future work is implementing the formal model.
Another area of future work is to extend the normative reasoning capability of the
model by allowing state based norms. Such an extension would allow the expression
of obligation and prohibitions to achieve or avoid some state before some deadline.
A combination of event and state based norms (e.g. [22]) enriches the norm represen-
tation as well as normative reasoning. Furthermore, the normative reasoning can be
extended by modelling permission norms as exceptions to obligation and prohibition
norms (see [23] for more details).
Regarding the dialogue, at the moment, the preference-based AF constructed based
on argument schemes and critical questions is converted to Dung’s AF before being
subjected to the persuasion dialogue. As a result the preference information is abstracted
away in the dialogue. For instance, the reason for a goal not being satisfied in a plan
could be because another goal that is in conflict with the former was satisfied in the plan.
Knowing that the attack relation between two goals is symmetric, there must have been
a preference relation that reduced the symmetric attack between the two goal arguments
to an asymmetric one which is not explicit in the dialogue. We plan to make the dialogue
game more informative by including information about preferences.
Traditionally, preferred semantics are used for practical reasoning because they pre-
serve the agent’s choices in case of unresolvable conflict between available courses of
actions. By allowing multiple plans in the grounded extension, this choice is available to
the agent. Having said that, as a part of future work, we are planning to apply preferred
semantics to the problem presented in this paper and compare the result with grounded
semantics.
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